

48110

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ E T

4 JAN 1951

1485

EUROPE

1. Adenauer's views on Soviet policy--Chancellor Adenauer has expressed to US High Commissioner McCloy his concern that Soviet acceptance of a CFM might mean postponement of any decisions regarding the future of Germany and its contribution to Western defense. Adenauer doubts that the USSR, either in a forthcoming CFM meeting or in East-West German talks, would ever agree to Western terms for free elections and free movement of political parties; he believes the USSR would attempt to preserve the present governmental structures in East and West Germany, placing both under an all-German governing council. Adenauer stated that any such political structure would of course be unacceptable to West Germany, because it would imply equality between East and West Germany and lead to renewed Communist pressure from inside. He said the USSR would probably also insist upon complete demilitarization of Germany and propose the withdrawal of all occupying forces.

25X1

25X6

2. Analysis of French opinion on Europe's defense--US Embassy Paris finds "encouraging" the trend of French opinion on Western defense despite the persistence of many major elements of weakness and the vulnerability

25X1

State Dept. review completed

- 1 -

Document No. 003

NO CHANGE in Class. ☐☐ DECLASSIFIED

Class. CHANGED TO: TS S (C)

DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763

Date: 3 APR 1978 By: 

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ E T

CONFIDENTIAL
TOP SECRET

of the French people to Communist propaganda. The Embassy believes that the French are increasingly convinced of the determination of the US, UK, and other NATO members to join in creating effective defensive strength on the continent. The Embassy also notes a growing belief that use by the Soviet Union of its military superiority may be prevented "by other than purely atomic factors." The Embassy finds heartening the limited possibilities of direct action on the part of the French Communists when compared with their capabilities two or three years ago. Nevertheless, the Embassy warns of the continued existence of apathy and defeatism in influential circles and calls attention to the susceptibility of the French to various plausible sounding proposals for delaying a major crisis with the Soviet Union.

3. Belgian attitude toward NATO--US Embassy Brussels concludes an analysis of Belgian willingness and capacity to contribute to Western European defense with the estimate that, on the whole, Belgium will probably meet its commitments to NATO in 1951. The Embassy is inclined to believe that despite the "undeniable" weakness of the present government, the Parliament after considerable wrangling will reluctantly vote the necessary defense budget and an extension of military service. On the negative side the Embassy cites, besides the weakness of the government, lack of confidence because of the country's exposed military position, precautionary measures of the wealthy to "cut and run" in case of invasion, and the feeling of the man in the street, born of centuries of experience with invaders and of ignorance of Soviet methods, that he can outlast and outwit even Russians. The Embassy notes, however, that these negative factors have produced a profound awareness that Belgian independence can be maintained only by effective union with other countries and by an actual state of collective security. Consequently, the Belgians give Western Europe an even chance of surviving if it pools its military resources with those of the US to create a balance of power which will insure peace.

25X1

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL
TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL

4. Prospects for Italo-Yugoslav agreement on Trieste--
US Embassy Rome expresses the view that the prospect at present of arriving at a solution of the problem of Trieste acceptable to both Italy and Yugoslavia is not sufficient to justify urging the Italian and Yugoslav governments to initiate secret negotiations on Trieste. The Embassy believes that neither government, under present national and international circumstances, would be prepared to agree voluntarily to a settlement based on ethnic considerations. The Embassy concludes that an unsuccessful attempt to reach a settlement might very well embitter Italian-Yugoslav relations to a degree that would cancel out the good progress thus far made in rapprochement.

25X1

FAR EAST

5. British views on Asian security--A Foreign Office official has informed US Embassy London that the UK has "no intention" of broaching the question of Southeast Asian security at the forthcoming meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, although it will discuss the question if it is raised by another Commonwealth member. The British official felt that any attempt to bring about a community of political interest in Southeast Asia would have to begin with steps toward economic stability rather than military security, and it was for this reason that the UK had placed so much stress and hope on the Colombo Plan. This plan was serving the "incalculable service of bringing Commonwealth nations together and forging a common economic bond," which, if developed along anticipated lines, would logically lead to a common military defense program. The official reiterated his hope that the US would participate in the Colombo Plan in some practical form.

25X1

- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL
~~TOP SECRET~~